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Foreign Banks in India: Liabilities or Assets? 
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Abstract: Using data on Indian banks for 1996-2007, the article examines the impact of foreign banks on 
the domestic banking sector. The analysis suggests that foreign bank penetration improves profitability 
and asset quality, although it dampens spreads. The results are robust to alternate measures of foreign 
bank presence. In addition, foreign banks appear to impact the maturity of credit portfolio of domestic 
banks. Finally, the results also support the fact that foreign banks typically charge lower interest rates as 
compared to domestic banks.  
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Introduction 
In emerging markets, the presence of foreign banks has increased substantially, 
particularly during the present decade. Such presence of foreign banks has raised several 
important questions: (a) what draws foreign bank to a country? (b) which (foreign) banks 
expand abroad? (c) how does mode of entry affect behaviour? and (d) how does foreign bank 
presence impinge on domestic profitability? The paper focuses on the final question, 
examining, in particular, on the impact of foreign banks on domestic bank performance, 
focusing on India as a case study. Our analysis suggests that foreign bank penetration 
improves profitability and asset quality, although it dampens spreads. The results also indicate 
that a rise in number of foreign bank initially lowers overheads as domestic banks reap the 
benefits of modern banking techniques, which, in turn, necessitates an increase in overheads.  
A number of factors make the banking sector in India an interesting case to study the 
interlinkage between foreign bank presence and domestic bank performance. First, over the 
1990s, India has undergone liberalization of the banking sector with the objective of enhancing 
efficiency, productivity and profitability (Government of India, 1991). Second, the banking 
sector witnessed important transformation, driven by the need for creating a market-driven, 
productive and competitive economy in order to support higher investment levels and 
accentuate growth. Third, most studies on foreign bank performance are either in the nature of 
cross-national studies (Terrel, 1986; Claessens et al, 2001; Hermes and Lensink, 2003; 
Martinez Peria and Mody, 2004; Detragiache et al, 2008) or banking markets in developed 
(Goldberg and Saunders, 1981; McFadden, 1994; Williams, 1998; Haas and Lelyveld, 2002), 
transition (Hsselmann, 2006) and MENA (Lee, 2002) countries. Little, if any by way of 
systematic empirical research, is available on this aspect for leading emerging economies. The 
issue as to the interplay between domestic bank performance and foreign bank presence in 
emerging markets as India where the financial system is pre-dominantly bank-based and 
government-owned remains a moot issue. The findings so obtained may have implications for 
the design of regulatory policies in other emerging economies. 
                                              
1 The views expressed and the approach pursued are strictly personal.  
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2 Literature and relevant hypothesis 
There are only a handful of empirical studies that directly examine the impact of 
liberalising foreign bank entry on the domestic banking market. Using bank-level data for 80 
developed and developing countries for the period 1980-95, Claessens et al. (2001) finds that 
an increase in foreign bank presence lowers profitability, non-interest income and overall 
operating expenses of domestic-owned banks. These results are interpreted as evidence that 
foreign bank entry improves the efficiency of national banking markets. 
Previous studies into foreign banks participation and net interest margins (Hermes and 
Lensink 2002, 2003) have established that foreign banks entry is associated with higher 
interest margins of banks in the short run. Quite often, authors have found that there is no 
statistically significant relationship between net interest margin and foreign banks’ share. This 
indicates that net interest margin is probably related to other factors, for example, overall 
competition on the market, banks’ own market share, money market interest rates, etc. Unite 
and Sullivan  (2003) observed that foreign banks entry is inversely associated with interest rate 
spreads of domestic banks, but only in case of those banks that are affiliated to a family 
business group. In effect, the competition engendered by the presence of foreign banks leads to 
a weakening of the banking relationship that these affiliated banks exhibit with certain 
domestic banks, leading to a decline in their spreads. Focusing on country studies, Denizer 
(1999) examined the effect of foreign entry on Turkish banks. The analysis supports the fact 
that foreign entry reduced domestic profitability and overhead expenses. Typically, a rise in 
competition is associated with a decline in net interest margins. As we expect a rise in 
competition in the market when the foreign banks’ share increases, we postulate H1: 
 
H1: The net interest margin of a bank in a given country is negatively correlated with foreign 
banks’ market share in that country 
 
A larger foreign bank presence can enhance the competitiveness of the banking sector. 
Greater competition is desirable for several reasons: to enhance efficiency of financial services, 
stimulate innovation and to contribute to overall stability. Available evidence appears to 
suggest that foreign ownership is associated with improved efficiency. Demirguc-Kunt et al. 
(2003) find that greater bank concentration is associated with lower bank efficiency in 
emerging economies. These observations lead us to the following hypothesis: 
 
H2: The efficiency of domestic banks in a given country is positively correlated with foreign 
banks’ share in that country 
 
A higher foreign banks’ share in the market is associated with lower overhead costs of 
banks, which indicates higher efficiency. Domestic banks typically react to foreign bank entry 
with higher overhead costs, especially in the short-run, presumably because they intend to 
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retain their clientele base in the face of increased competition by greater investments in 
technology and manpower. We propose the following hypothesis:  
 
H3: The overhead costs of domestic banks in a given country are (typically) negatively correlated 
with the foreign bank’s share in that country. 
 
The ratio of a bank’s profits to its total assets reflects the overall profitability outcome of 
the bank. Foreign banks entry is usually expected to have a positive effect on the competition 
in the banking market and therefore, via lower net interest margins, is expected to exert a 
negative effect on banks’ profitability. Based on these considerations, we propose the following 
hypothesis: 
 
H4: The ratio of pre-tax profits to the total assets of domestic banks in a given country are 
negatively correlated with foreign banks’ share in that country 
 
The effect of foreign banks entry on banks’ NPLs is ambiguous because foreign banks 
entry may have both positive and negative effects on the quality of loans. Foreign banks are 
more likely to exhibit better credit risk management techniques and as a result, higher foreign 
ownership could entail “cherry picking” of the best borrowers. On the other hand, if better 
credit risk management by foreign banks impels domestic banks to improve their credit 
evaluation skills, the effect of greater foreign bank presence on domestic banks’ NPLs could be 
negative. These factors lead us to advance the following hypothesis:  
 
H5: Foreign banks’ share in the country has either a positive or a negative  impact on the non-
performing loans of domestic banks 
 
Foreign banks could also impact loan maturity and composition. Foreign banks might 
bring in hot money, which can be easily withdrawn in a crisis (Rodrik and Velasco, 1999). 
Foreign banks may also use shorter loan maturities to mitigate the risks of credit default and 
asymmetric information (Ortiz-Molina and Penas, 2008). This leads us to our final hypothesis: 
 
H6: Foreign bank entry is associated with lower overall lending rates, although the impact on 
loan maturity and composition is ambiguous 
 
There is also a body of literature that highlights the importance of an effective banking 
regulatory system. Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) demonstrated that countries with 
weak institutional environment are faced with greater prospects of instability in their banking 
sector for some time immediately following liberalization. La Porta et al. (1997) investigate how 
certain legal and political features evolve and demonstrate that a country’s legal system is 
determined primarily by its culture and history. Rajan and Zingales (2000) expand on this work 
and demonstrate a link between political considerations and the institutional impediments to 
financial development. Overall, these studies report that many countries do not develop 
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efficient financial and legal systems, even when it is generally agreed to be economically 
beneficial, because of political-economy considerations.  
 
3. Foreign bank presence in India: Salient features 
The market access for foreign financial service providers to undertake ‘banking activity’ 
as defined under Section 6 of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949, is limited to branch operations 
of a foreign bank licensed and supervised as a bank in its home country. The different forms of 
market access by foreign suppliers of banking services include (a) representative office, which 
cannot undertake any banking business or any commercial activity; they can, however, 
undertake activities such as correspondent banking, loan syndication or risk management for 
companies engaged in raising money overseas and international trade financial such as 
buyers/suppliers credit to the Indian importers; (b) agency arrangements with individuals, 
firms/companies or other organisations in India; and (c) equity participation in domestic 
Indian banks (upto a maximum of 40% for non-resident Indians and associated overseas 
corporate bodies, including no more than 20% stake for foreign financial institutions)2.  
The number of licences is fixed in conformity with India's commitment made to World 
Trade Organisation, which are presently 12 licences (both for new and expansion by existing 
banks) per year. However, off-site ATMs are treated as separate places of business and need 
separate branch licenses, as under Section 23 of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949, but these 
licenses are not to be included in the ceiling of 12 licenses mentioned above. 
As on March 31, 1993, there were 24 foreign banks operating in India with 138 bank 
offices. By end-March 1996, this number increased to 39 which accounted for 7.9 per cent of 
total assets of scheduled commercial banks. The number stood at 44 by end-March 1999, with 
their share in total assets of SCBs being 8.1 per cent. At end-March 2007, consequent upon 
some mergers/consolidation in this segment internationally, the number of foreign banks was 
29 with 273 branches; their share in total assets of commercial banks was roughly 8 per cent 
(Table 1). Taken in conjunction with these two banks, the total deposit and loan market share 
of foreign banks is around the 20 percent mark.  
Based on the announcements in the Union Budget 2005-06, the RBI announced roadmap 
for entry of foreign banks. The salient features of these guidelines were as follows: 
• Foreign banks wishing to establish presence in India for the first time could either choose 
to operate through branch presence or set up 100 wholly owned subsidiaries (WOS). 
 
• For new and existing foreign banks, it is proposed to go beyond the existing WTO 
commitments of 12 branches in a year. Branch licensing procedure will continue to be as 
per the current practice. 
 
• In the first phase, foreign banks already operating in India will be allowed to convert their 
existing branches to WOS following the one-mode presence criterion. 
                                              
2 In the Federal Budget 2003-04, this limit has been raised to 74 per cent. 
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4. Empirical framework and database 
 To assess the impact of foreign bank presence on bank performance, while controlling 
for the macro and institutional environment, following Claessens et al (2001), we estimate 
regressions of the following form:  
ittttsts MZBy εϕϕϕϕ ++++= − 321,10,                                                                           (2)               
where s indexes bank and t denotes year; ϕ s’ are the parameters to be estimated.  
 In (2), the dependent variable (y) is assumed to be a function of bank-level controls (B) 
lagged one period to avoid endogeneity problems, time-varying banking industry specific 
variables (Z), including measures of foreign bank penetration and macroeconomic controls (M), 
such as real GDP growth and real interest rate.  
 
4.1 Dependent variables 
To measure bank performance, we employ five sets of dependent variables: NIM as a 
measure of bank competition, RoA as the measure of bank profitability, Overhead as a measure 
of bank operating costs, NPLs as a measure of bank soundness and CIR as a measure of bank 
efficiency. Most of these variables are fairly standard in the literature and have been employed 
in previous studies of this genre (Claessens et al., 2001; Hermes and Lensink, 2004).  
When we examine the impact of foreign bank presence on credit allocation, the 
dependent variable (y) is re-defined as ln[ps,t /(1-ps,t)], where p is the share of loans: by sector, 
by  maturity and by security of bank s at time t, the remaining variables are the same as in (2) 
earlier. In terms of credit allocation, we consider the following variables: private sector credit, 
two variables capturing credit maturity: cash credit and term loan, and one variable capturing 
the collateralization of loan - secured credit. All the variables are defined as ratios to total 
credit. Finally, we explore the impact of foreign bank presence on bank lending rate. In our 
empirical specification, following previous literature (Martinez Peria and Schmukler, 2001), we 
define the lending rate as the interest earned on loans to total loans.  
 
4.2 Foreign bank variable 
Of particular interest in (2) is the foreign bank variable. We consider three variables 
which encapsulate foreign bank existence. The first is the asset share of foreign banks, the 
second is the number of foreign banks to total commercial banks (FB_Number) and finally, the 
ratio of foreign bank branches to total metropolitan commercial bank branches (FB_Branch). 
We scale FB_Branch by total number of metropolitan branches (as opposed to total bank 
branches) in order to take into account the fact that foreign bank presence is typically confined 
to metropolitan areas and therefore, their competition is more with metropolitan branches of 
other bank groups.  
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4.3.Bank-specific controls  
 We include four bank-specific variables: bank size, bank liquidity, capital adequacy 
ratio (CAR) and share of rural and semi-urban branches. The natural logarithm of total assets 
(SIZE) is included to capture any scale efficiency effects. We hypothesize that a domestic bank’s 
response to foreign bank entry may be related to domestic bank’s size, which proxies for the 
extent of its relationship and reputation. Having more concrete relationships and an enhanced 
reputation are expected to be positively correlated with the relative size of the bank. The CRAR 
is included to capture different levels of risks across banks with low ratios indicating relatively 
risky positions (Ghosh, 2004). With a sizeable presence in rural and semi-urban areas, 
domestic  
 
4.4 Banking industry variables 
 The banking industry level variables include a proxy for bank concentration and a 
measure of market power of banks. Contextually, in their cross-country study, Demirguc Kunt 
et al. (2004) and Martinez Peria and Mody (2004) find bank concentration to be a significant 
and influential factor in determining net interest margin. The measure of market power is the 
Herfindahl index of loan concentration, defined as the sum of squares of loan market share.  
 
4.5 Macroeconomic variables  
Consistent with the literature (Martinez Peria and Mody, 2004; Demirguc Kunt et al., 
2004), the macroeconomic variables included are a measure of short-term real interest rate 
and the growth rate of real GDP.  The measure of economic growth is included to control for 
any effect that general increases in economic activity may have on banks’ operations. 
The sample comprises of 47 banks, including all state-owned banks, 13 old private and 
6 de novo private (operational post inception of reforms) for the period 1996-2007, yielding a 
total of 517 bank-years.3 We employ a balanced dataset. This excludes the possibility that the 
results are biased due to the fact that we have different number of observations for different 
banks.   
 
5. Results and discussion 
5.1 Baseline regressions 
The results of the empirical analysis are presented in Table 2. The results in Col. (1) 
show that foreign bank penetration is positively related to profits, and negatively to spread, 
overhead expenses and non-performing loans. The analysis supports H1 and H3, but is 
contrary to H4. The positive relation with the profitability measure in essence, indicates that 
foreign bank penetration lowers the level of competition in the banking sector. 
                                              
3 One year of observation is lost owing to inclusion of lagged values of bank-specific controls 
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These results are echoed in Col. (2), where foreign bank indicator is measured in terms 
of physical presence. In particular specifically, greater foreign bank presence lowers overheads 
and NPLs.  
In Col. (3) the evidence indicates that profitability improves and NPLs declines with a 
rise in foreign bank outreach. In addition, the evidence concurs with H2: foreign bank presence 
is efficiency-enhancing.  
Turning to bank-specific controls, we find that bigger banks are more profitable and 
efficient, although they also have higher operating costs. This can be interpreted to mean that 
size allows for greater diversification, allowing domestic banks to reap scale economies, 
perhaps at the cost of higher expenses. Domestic banks are compelled to maintain higher 
capitalization under the impact of foreign entry in order to sustain their spreads. At the same 
time, well-captialized banks are found to have lower NPLs. The inverse relation between capital 
and risk (NPLs) has been widely documented, both in the Indian context (Das and Ghosh, 
2005) and in the international context (Kwan and Eisenbis, 1997; Rime, 2001; Stolz, 2009).  
Turning to ownership dummies, the evidence indicates that SOBs have higher spreads, 
although their profitability and efficiency levels are low as compared to old private banks.  The 
evidence appears to indicate that higher market concentration has certain benefits, but it also 
comes at a cost. On the one hand, higher loan concentration improves margins as banks are 
able to generate “rents”, but it also makes banks less efficient, leading to higher overheads and 
cost-income ratios. 
Our results are at variance to those of Claessens et al. (2001). First, both indicators of 
foreign bank entry are statistically significant at conventional levels, unlike the aforesaid 
mentioned study wherein only one indicator of foreign bank entry is significant. Second, there 
seem to a negative relationship between foreign bank presence and most cost and income 
variables, although the effect on interest margin is not so clear-cut. This would suggest that 
the relationship between foreign bank entry and domestic bank performance has non-linear 
properties. It might well be possible that foreign bank entry has both positive and negative 
effects on income, profits and costs. On the positive side, technology spillovers of new banking 
techniques and better management practices may lead domestic banks to initially raise their 
costs in order to implement such practices. However, over time, as such practices get imbibed 
in domestic banks, they are able to proactively compete with their foreign counterparts. At the 
same time, with increased competition arising out of foreign bank entry, there might be a flight 
of good-quality customers to foreign banks, which, over time, would get reflected in a 
weakening of loan portfolio of domestic banks. This would, in effect, necessitate higher loan 
loss provisioning by domestic banks (i.e., higher costs). The effect might be compounded for 
domestic banks owing to the smaller base of loan portfolio of these banks, implying fewer 
possibilities for them to diversify risks. 
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5.2 Credit allocation 
 The evidence presented in Table 3 indicates that foreign banks – whether defined in 
terms of penetration or physical presence – have an impact on loan maturity, although its 
impact on loan collateralizability or sectoral composition is not significant. In terms of the 
impact on loan maturity, the findings suggest that foreign banks lend less at the short-term 
and more at long-term than domestic banks. Presumably because foreign banks extend loans 
based on “hard” information, they enter into relationship lending with informationally 
transparent firms, on a long-term basis. These results appear consistent with previous studies 
for emerging markets, which support the idea that foreign banks are more adept in lending to 
transparent firms (Mian, 2007; Gormley, 2008; Giannetti and Ongena, 2006).  
 
5.3 Lending rates 
 Looking at lending rates, the results indicate that foreign bank penetration and 
outreach have a dampening impact on lending rates of domestic banks. In terms of 
penetration, it is observed that foreign banks charge their borrowers anywhere between 1.73 to 
1.77 percent less per year. The results as also the magnitudes are consistent with previous 
studies which report that lending rates charged by foreign banks are typically lower as 
compared to domestic counterparts (Dell’Ariccia and Marquez, 2004; Clayes and Hainz, 2006).  
 
6. Concluding remarks 
 The article seeks to demonstrate the impact of foreign bank entry on the performance of 
domestic banks in India. Towards this end, we combined bank-level micro data with 
macroeconomic and banking industry-level indicators to estimate foreign bank entry effects. In 
line with the realities of Indian markets, foreign bank presence is measured in three distinct 
ways – asset share, branch share (in metropolitan areas) and number of foreign banks. The 
evidence serves to demonstrate that foreign bank penetration improves profitability and asset 
quality, although it dampens spreads.  
To summarize, the overall conclusion reached in the analysis is that the benefits of 
foreign bank presence appear to overwhelm the costs, implying they are more of “assets” as 
opposed to “liabilities”. Further research, would of course be necessary to ascertain whether 
the mode (greenfield versus takeover) and type (branch versus subsidiary) of foreign bank 
presence exerts any perceptible impact on domestic bank performance.  
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Table 1: Share of banking market (per cent) 
Year/ Bank group Assets Loans Deposits 
1993    
Public sector banks (PSB) 86.5 88.1 87.3 
Old private banks (OPB) 4.6 4.6 5.1 
New private banks (NPB) -- -- -- 
Foreign banks (FB) 6.4 4.8 5.4 
2002    
PSB 75.3 74.4 80.5 
OPB 6.1 6.5 6.7 
NPB 11.4 11.5 12.1 
FB 7.3 7.5 5.4 
2007    
PSB 70.5 72.7 73.9 
OPB 4.6 4.7 5.1 
NPB 16.9 16.2 15.3 
FB 7.9 6.4 5.6 
Source: RBI (various years) 
 
Table 2. Foreign Bank Entry and Domestic Bank Performance 
 Lagged (foreign bank variable) Lagged (Bank-specific controls) Bank-industry 
controls 
Ownership 
dummies 
  
Variable Asset Number Branch Size Liquidt
y 
CAR H-loan Conc SOB NPB Const. Adj. R-
square
d 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Panel A            
NIM -0.09 
(0.05)a 
  Yes 0.25 
RoA 0.29 
(0.09)a 
  Yes 0.17 
Overhd -0.02 
(0.006)a 
  Yes 0.48 
NPL -0.01 
(0.004)a 
  Yes 0.43 
Panel B            
NIM  0.0006 
(0.015) 
 Yes 0.25 
RoA  0.02 
(0.017) 
 Yes 0.17 
Overhd  -0.002 
(0.0009)b 
 Yes 0.48 
NPL  -0.18 
(0.057)a 
 Yes 0.43 
Panel C            
NIM   -0.003 
(0.089) 
Yes 0.25 
RoA   0.77 
(0.228)a 
Yes 0.19 
Overhd   -0.0007 
(0.002) 
Yes 0.47 
NPL   -0.15 
(0.079)c 
Yes 0.43 
Standard errors (clustered by bank) are within parentheses 
a, b and c denote statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10, respectively 
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Table 3. Foreign banks and credit allocation 
 Lagged (Foreign bank variable ) 
(natural log) 
Lagged (Bank-specific 
controls) 
Bank-industry 
controls 
Ownership 
dummies 
  
Variable Asset Number Branch Size Liqudty CAR H-loan Conc SOB NPB Const. Adj. R-
square 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Panel A            
Cash 
cred. 
-1.3 
(0.4)a 
  YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 0.34 
Pvt. loan 0.19 
(0.2) 
  YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 0.53 
Panel B            
Cash 
cred. 
 -0.63 
(0.2)b 
 YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 0.34 
Pvt. loan  0.27 (0.2)  YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 0.53 
Panel C            
Cash 
cred. 
  -0.07 
(0.1) 
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 0.33 
Pvt. loan   -0.09 
(0.1) 
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 0.53 
Standard errors (clustered by bank) are within parentheses 
a, b and c denote statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10, respectively 
 
 
Table 4. Foreign banks and lending rate 
  Lagged (Bank-specific 
controls) 
Bank-industry 
controls 
Ownership 
dummies 
  
 Asset Number Branch Size Liquidit
y 
CAR H-loan Conc SOB NPB Const. Adj. R-
square
d 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
-1.7 
(0.362)a 
  YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 0.59 
 -0.09 
(0.07) 
 YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 0.59 
  -1.7 
(0.608)a 
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 0.59 
Standard errors (clustered by bank) are within parentheses 
a, b and c denote statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10, respectively 
